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1. INTRODUCTION
France suffered a decisive defeat in June 1996 when the
European Union's Council of Culture Ministers ruled "once and
for all" that it would not impose stricter limits on non-European
programs in the European Union.' Earlier in 1995, France had
campaigned in the European Union for stricter television
programming quotas in order "to prevent Hollywood productions
from inundating European television."2 In opposition to the
French, several nations of the European Union, including Britain
and Germany, had campaigned to eliminate all quotas on
television programming.' In an attempt to reach a compromise
* J.D. Candidate, 1997, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 1994,
University of California, Los Angeles. This Comment is dedicated to my
grandmother Wei-Chin Chao for her love and inspiration. Thank you to
Professor C. Edwin Baker for his helpful suggestions. Special thanks to
Nicholas Demmo and Rosi Blake for their support and assistance in editing this
piece.
' Janet McEvoy, Parliament Snubbed Over Television Directive, Reuter
European Community Report, June 11, 1996, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Reuec File [hereinafter McEvoy, Parliament Snubbed].
2 European TV Programming Quotas Still Flexible, Despite French Efforts,
Int'l Bus. & Fin. Daily (BNA), Nov. 22, 1995, available in LEXIS, News
Library, BNAIBF File [hereinafter European TV Programming].
' See Janet McEvoy, Council Agrees on Television Directive, Reuter
European Community Report, Nov. 20, 1995, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Reuec File [hereinafter McEvoy, Council Agrees].
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between these two sides, the Council of Culture Ministers agreed
on November 20, 1995 to maintain the current television
programming import quotas for Hollywood productions.4 The
quotas, which were to last for five years, required that at least
51% of the European Union's television programming be of
European origin "where practicable."' France had campaigned
vigorously to remove the phrase "where practicable" because it
was a major loophole which allowed many broadcasters to ignore
the 51% requirement.6
The debate continued between the two sides when on
February 14, 1996, the European Parliament voted in opposition
to the Council of Ministers by dropping the "where practicable"
language and mandating that at least 51% of European program-
ming be of European origin.7 Because of the European Union's
dual decision making process, the Council of Ministers had the
final say on the matter.' On June 11, 1996, the Council of
Ministers decided to retain its original decision of November 1995,
maintaining the "where practicable" loophole.9 The European
Parliament lacked the requisite votes on November 12, 1996, to
overturn the Council of Ministers' decision.
10
This recent European Union strife was watched closely by the
United States," which lost a major battle to preserve the free
trade of audiovisual products during the Uruguay Round of the
See European TV Programming, supra note 2.
s See Emma Tucker, EUs Ministers Finally in Tune on Broadcasting, FIN.
TiMES, Nov. 21, 1995, at 3.
6 See id.
I See European Parliament Backs Tough Restrictions on Imported TV
Programs, Int'l Bus. & Fin. Daily (BNA), Feb. 15, 1996, available in LEXIS,
News Library, BNAIBF File [hereinafter European Parliament Backs Tough
Restrictions].
I See McEvoy, Parliament Snubbed, supra note 1 (stating that after the
Council of Ministers reviewed the issue in June, 1996, the European Parliament
would be in "a poor negotiating position as, if the two institutions fail to
resolve their squabble during conciliation, the law [containing the "where
practicable" language] will remain exactly as it is").
9 See id.
10 See Janet McEvoy, EU Parliament Drops Demand for Television Quotas,
Reuter European Community Report, Nov. 12, 1996, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Reuec File [hereinafter McEvoy, EU Parliament Drops Demand].
" See Suzanne Perry, EU Close to Accord on Controversial U.S. TV Quotas,
Reuters, Nov. 16, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuna File.
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General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT").12 During
the Uruguay Round, the European Union, led by France, had
argued for a cultural exemption of audiovisual trade, while the
United States had wanted audiovisual trade included in the GATT
in order to guarantee its free trade. 3 Unable to reach an agree-
ment on the treatment of audiovisual trade, the two sides "agreed
to disagree" on the issue in order to salvage the rest of the GATT,
which was the result of seven long years of negotiation.
14
Although most people saw the failure to include the audiovisu-
al trade in the GATT as a defeat for the United States and a
victory for the European Union,"5 recent events, such as the
Council of Ministers' decision not to impose stricter television
programming quotas, demonstrate that ultimately the Uruguay
Round decision will not hurt the American audiovisual trade
industry.
Section 2 of this Comment traces the history of the audiovisu-
al trade between the United States and the European Union.
Section 3 discusses the legitimacy of the European Union's
cultural identity argument. Section 3 provides examples of actions
taken by the U.S. government in the field of broadcasting that
were motivated by cultural protectionist concerns. Section 4
12 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
13 See E.C., U.S. Differences Remain on Audiovisuals; More Talks in GA7T
Needed, EC Official Says, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 41, at 1777 (Oct. 20,
1993) [hereinafter Diferences Remain]; U.S. Urges Free Worldwide Trade in
Movies, Radio Programs During Uruguay Round Talks, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
No. 36, at 1369 (Sept. 12, 1990).
14 See Edward Luce, The Deal: High Price of Accord in Services Package,
GUARDIAN, Dec. 15, 1993, at 12. President Bill Clinton stated that removing
audiovisual trade from the GATT was "certainly better than leaving a weak
agreement in or catering the whole round over it, because there's just too much
aggregate economic benefit to the United States from the overall tariff
reductions to not try to keep the round intact." Clinton Says Emerging
Uruguay Round Pact Is in U.S. Interest Despite Shortcomings, Int'l Trade Daily
(BNA), Dec. 16, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, BNAITD File.
15 At the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, French Communications
Minister Alain Carignon said of the exclusion of audiovisual trade from the
GATT: "[t]his is a great and beautiful victory for Europe and for French
culture. Alan Riding, Months of Risk, Moments of Isolation, Now Boasts of
Triumph, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1993, at D19. Compare that statement with
one made by former French Culture Minister Jack Lang, who maintained that
"[i]t's not a victory of one country over another. It's a victory for art and
artists over the commercialization of culture." Id.
112919961
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discusses the technological advances in the globalization of
communication and the integration of the European nations.
Finally, Section 5 concludes that regardless of the legitimacy of
the cultural exemption argument for audiovisual trade, the
globalization of communication and the unification of Europe
eventually will render ineffective attempts by individual European
Union member states to restrict the influx of American film and
television.
2. HISTORY OF AuDIOvISuAL TRADE BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
The importance of audiovisual trade to both the United States
and the European Union was made abundantly clear during the
Uruguay Round when the failure to reach an agreement on the
issue threatened to derail seven years of negotiations. 6 For the
United States, audiovisual trade is big business. During 1993, the
audiovisual trade between the United States and the European
Union totaled almost four billion dollars. 17 Entertainment is the
United States' second largest export after aerospace. 8 President
Bill Clinton initially promised the American film industry that he
would not sign the GATT unless the European Union agreed to
reduce the protectionist measures that restricted broadcasting of
American film and television in Europe. 9
From the European Union's perspective, the United States'
dominance in the audiovisual market threatens Europe's cultural
16 See Differences Remain, supra note 13, at 1777.
'7 See David R. Sands, Clash of Cultures Creates Latest Block to World Trade
Pact, WASH. TiMES, Nov. 24, 1993, at B7.
"8 See Alexander Cockburn, The Two-Way Street, GUARDIAN, May 12, 1995,
at 2. Cockburn writes that in 1990, the Hollywood movie studios:
took in $1.8 billion in rental fees inside the [United States] and $1.6
billion in rentals from foreign distributors. American films take up
more than 90 per cent of all screen time in countries as disparate as
Canada, Nigeria and Brazil.... In 1992 U.S. audio-visual exports to
Europe amounted to $3.7 billion in value, while equivalent [European
Community] exports to the [United States] amounted to only $288
million.
Id.
19 See John Carvel, European Film-Makers Close to Deal with Hollywood,
GAZETTE cMontreal), Nov. 3, 1994, at C9.
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identity.2 As of 1995, "American films account[ed] for over 70%
of all box office receipts in the European Union."21 Philippe
Douste-Blazy, France's Culture Minister, claims that French
children now only recognize police cars and ambulances with
American-sounding sirens? Drawing on Walt Disney's Mickey
Mouse, Jacques Toubon, former French Minister of Culture and
French Language, said that "[t]he danger is that the mouse will kill
all the other animals in the kingdom."'
To fully understand the current debate over audiovisual trade
between the United States and the European Union, it is necessary
to trace the historical development of audiovisual trade between
these two trading partners.
2.1. Audiovisual Trade and the GA7T
The GATT, established in 1948, was originally joined by
twenty-three trading nations to provide "the first and 'only
multilateral instrument' which sets out 'agreed rules for interna-
tional trade."' 24  Article III of the GATT requires that the
member governments accord imported goods from other contract-
ing parties "the same treatment as goods of local origin with
respect to matters under government control, such as taxation and
regulation."' In Article IV26 of the GATT, the original con-
20 One writer notes that:
[w]hen Steven Spielberg's Jurassic Park came to Paris, the ticket lines
ran around the block. At the same time, high-budget French films like
Queen Margot were only moderately successful at home .... French
couch potatoes tune in Baywatch and Santa Barbara and tune out
French programs. French teenagers buy Madonna or Nirvana CDs.
French computer nerds hack away at English-language programs and
games. Contemporary art connoisseurs in Paris fawn over Roy
Lichtenstein and Robert Rauschenberg.
Paul Klebnikov, Minister Toubon, Meet General Gamelin, FORBES, May 22, 1995,
at 292.
21 Id.
22 See Stephen Bates, Hollywood to Coach EU Young Guns, GUARDIAN, Dec.
28, 1995, at 8.
23 Klebnikov, supra note 20, at 292.
24 Marie Louise Hurabiell, Comment, Protectionism Versus Free Trade:
Implementing the GA TTAntidumping Agreement in the United States, 16 U. PA.
J. INT'L Bus. L. 567, 569 (1995) (citation omitted).
2 JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 273
(1969).
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tracting parties decided to allow an exception to Article III
requirements for cinematograph films.V Article IV allows
member states to establish domestic quotas for film, thereby
dedicating a set percentage of screen time to films of national
21origin. Commentators speculate that GATT's draftsmen
allowed the cinema exception to the national treatment obligation
of Article III "because its regulation was more related to domestic
cultural policies than to economics and trade."29
In 1961, the United States questioned the treatment afforded
television programs and argued that the Article IV exception for
cinema films should not apply to television." The United States
maintained that restriction of foreign television programs violated
Article IV of the GATT establishes special provisions relating to
cinematograph films and states that:
If any contracting party establishes or maintains internal quantita-
tive regulations relating to exposed cinematograph films, such
regulations shall take the form of screen quotas which shall conform
to the following requirements:
a) screen quotas may require the exhibition of cinematograph films
of national origin during a specified minimum proportion of the
total screen time actually utilized, over a specified period of notless than one year, in the commercial exhibition of all films of
whatever origin, and shall be computed on the basis of screen time
per theatre per year or the equivalent thereof;
b) with the exception of screen time reserved for films of national
origin under a screen quota, screen time including that released by
administrative action from screen time reserved for films of
national origin, shall not be allocated formally or in effect among
sources of supply;
c) notwithstanding the provisions of sub-paragraph (b) of this
Article, any contracting party may maintain screen quotas
conforming to the requirements of sub-paragraph (a) of this
Article which reserve a minimum proportion of screen time for
films of a specified origin other than that of the contracting party
imposing such screen quotas; Provided that no such minimum
proportion of screen time shall be increased above the level in
effect on April 10, 1947;
d) screen quotas shall be subject to negotiation for their limitation,
liberalization or elimination.
GATT art. IV.
27 See id. art. I(4)(b).
21 See id. art. IV.
29 JACKSON, supra note 25, at 293.
" See W. Ming Shao, Is There No Business Like Show Business? Free Trade
and Cultural Protectionism, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 105, 111-12 (1995).
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Article III of the GATT.31 The United States conceded, howev-
er, that the governments of the contracting parties may have a
legitimate interest in television programming because of its
influence on domestic culture.32 The contracting parties set up
a Working Party to consider the fate of television programs, but
it was unable to reach an agreement on the matter.3 3 No final
action was taken with respect to television programs by the
GATT.
34
2.2. The Television Without Frontiers Directive
In 1989, the European Community 35 enacted a controversial
broadcasting directive, popularly known as the "Television
Without Frontiers Directive. "36 The Directive required that 51%
31 See Application of GA 7T to International Trade in Television Programmes,
GATT Doc. L/1646 (Nov. 21, 1961) (statement by the U.S. Representative).
32 See id.
33 See JACKSON, supra note 25, at 294.
34 See id.
31 In 1993, the European Community was renamed the European Union
by the Maastricht Treaty. See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 224) 1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992)
(entered into force Nov. 1, 1993), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 247 (1992) [hereinafter
Maastricht Treaty].
36 Council Directive 89/552 of 3 October 1989 on Coordination of Certain
Provisions Laid Down by Law, Regulation or Administrative Action in
Member States Concerning the Pursuit of Television Broadcasting Activities,
1989 O.J. (L 298) 23 [hereinafter Directive].
Article 4 of the Directive provides that:
Member States shall ensure where practicable and by appropriate
means, that broadcasters reserve for European works ... a majority
proportion of their transmission time, excluding the time appointed to
news, sports events, games, advertising and teletext services. This
proportion, havine regard to the broadcaster's informational, educa-
tional, cultural ancentertainment responsibilities to its viewing public,
should be achieved progressively, on the basis of suitable criteria.
Id. art. 4.
Article 6 of the Directive states that:
1. Within the meaning of this chapter, "European works" means the
following:
a) works originating from Member States of the Community
and, as regards television broadcasters falling within the juris-
diction of the Federal Republic of Germany, works from
German territories where the Basic Law does not apply and
fulfilling the conditions of paragraph 2;
113319961
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of all European entertainment programming be of European
origin.37 Although no specific nation was targeted by the Direc-
tive, it "was fairly obviously a measure to restrict Hollywood im-
ports."3" The United States opposed the Directive,39 as did
several European nations, including the United Kingdom, Italy,
Spain, West Germany, Denmark, and Belgium.' In response to
this opposition, the European Community Council of Ministers
retreated somewhat from their original strict 51% requirement.
The Council of Ministers changed the wording of the Directive so
b) works originating from European third States party to the
European Convention on Transfrontier Television of the
Council of Europe and fulfilling the conditions of paragraph
2;
c) works originating from other European third countries and
fulfilling the conditions of paragraph 3.
2. The works referred to in paragraph 1 (a) and (b) are works mainly
made with authors and workers residing in one or more States referred
to in paragraph 1 (a) and (b) provided that they comply with one of
the following three conditions:
(a) they are made by one or more producers established in one
or more of those States; or
(b) production of the works is supervised and actually controlled
by one or more producers established in one or more of those
States; or
(c) the contribution of co-producers of those States to the total
co-production costs is preponderant and the co-production is
not controlled by one or more producers established outside
those States.
3. The works referred to in paragraph 1 (c) are works made exclusive-
ly or in co-production with producers established in one or more
Member State by producers established in one or more European third
countries with which the Community will conclude agreements in
accordance with the procedures of the Treaty, if those works are
mainly made with authors and workers residing in one or more
European States.
Id. art. 6.
37 See id. art. 4(1).
31 Eu NOAM, TELEVISION IN EUROPE 293 (1991).
" See id. ("Several measures were proposed by Congress, including a
retaliatory plan prohibiting the Corporation for Public Broadcasting from
buying European programs. The U.S. Commerce Department also filed a
complaint with the GATT arguing that the directive was protectionist.").
40 See id. (adding that "[t]he Bavarian government challenged the [European
Community's] right to promulgate cultural laws, and other countries were
uneasy about [European Community] interference in cultural affairs").
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that it required the member states to broadcast 51% European
originated programs "where practicable."
41
The addition of the vague "where practicable" phrase meant
that each member state can decide autonomously whether to
mandate the 51% programming requirement. Indeed, a report
regarding the effects of the Directive indicated that certain
European channels did not apply the 51% programming require-
ment.42 For example, in "Italy, Spain, Belgium, Greece, Germa-
ny, Luxembourg, France (one cable channel) and [the] United
Kingdom (certain satellite channels), certain channels did not
broadcast the requisite proportion of European works."43
2.3. Uruguay Round of the GATE
Negotiations on the Uruguay Round of the GATT concluded
on December 15, 1993." More than 100 nations signed the Final
Agreement in Marrakesh, Morocco on April 15, 1994.4' The
Uruguay Round Agreement liberalized trade significantly and has
been called a "boon to freer trade."46 Despite all the accomplish-
ments of the Final Agreement, the contracting parties of the
GATT failed to reach an agreement as to the treatment of
audiovisual goods and services.47 During the negotiation stage,
the European Union argued for a cultural exception for audiovisu-
al trade.48 The United States opposed this exception and pressed
41 See id.
42 See Alan Forrest, Can Community Su port Measures Have a Decisive
Impact on European Film and Television Production?, 8 EUR. Bus. J. 36, 39
(1996) (citing a May 1995 report on the working of the Directive which
accompanied a proposal to amend the Directive).
43 Id.
" See Uruguay RoundAgreement Is Reached, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No.
49, at 2103 (Dec. 15, 1993).
" See Over 100 Nations Sign GATTAccord to Cut Barriers to World Trade,
11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at 610 (Apr. 20, 1994).
46 Shao, supra note 30, at 106. One writer comments that "the simple fact
is that the [Uruguay GATT] accord is a huge achievement. To have allowed
it to fail would have been unthinkable. This eighth round of the [GATT]...
will lead to greater trade and faster economic growth. Tariffs and quotas will
go down, and consumers here [in the United States] and all over the world will
benefit." Hobart Rowen, GA TT Accord: A Massive, But Maybe Moot, Success,
WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 1993, at H1.
41 See Luce, supra note 14, at 12.
48 See Shao, supra note 30, at 113.
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to include audiovisuals in the GATT so as to guarantee its free
trade.49 In the end, despite repeated attempts at negotiation,
mainly between the United States and the European Union," the
opposing sides could not reach an agreement and audiovisual trade
was left out of the Uruguay Round Agreement."
2.4. Recent European Union Television Quota Decision
On June 11, 1996, the European Union's Council of Culture
Ministers decided to maintain the European Union's existing
television programming quotas.52 At first glance, this decision
appears to be a defeat for the American audiovisual industry, but
a closer examination reveals that the reinstatement of the
Directive's quota requirements in the European Union may
actually benefit the United States. While the European Union has
refused to eliminate the Television Without Frontiers Directive
quota requirement, 3 it has maintained the Directive's "where
practicable" loophole. 4 This loophole in essence "allows many
broadcasters to ignore the rules."55The debate within the European Union to toughen television
quotas began almost two years ago.56 France had campaigned for
tougher quotas and for striking the words "where practicable" in
order to keep Hollywood from dominating European screens.5 7
Other European Union nations, including Britain, Germany,
Austria, and Italy, had wanted to phase out quotas altogether,
arguing that they violated free trade principles.58 In November
1995, the Spanish Presidency of the European Union brokered an
accord between the two sides to maintain the existing Directive
49 See id.
s See Differences Remain, supra note 13, at 1777.
51 See Luce, supra note 14, at 12.
52 See Tom Buerkle, EU Ministers Extend Accord on Nonbinding TV Quotas,
INT'L IERALD TRIB., June 12, 1996, at 5.
5 See Directive, supra note 36 and accompanying text.
5' See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
Tucker, supra note 5, at 3.
56 See Buerkle, supra note 52, at 5 (stating that the debate throughout
Europe started approximately in January 1995).
5 See McEvoy, Council Agrees, supra note 3.
5 See Perry, supra note 11.
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requirements and to review the Directive again in five years.5 9
The debate, however, did not end with the November 1995
agreement because of the European Union's co-decision procedure,
which requires a common position between the European Council
and the European Parliament.' The European Council generally
"' See McEvoy, Council Agrees, supra note 3. Neither side is completely
satisfied with the agreement. Culture Commissioner Marcelino Oreja, who had
worked on the proposed accord, stated that "[n]obody can say they are 100
percent happy with this. But it is the best we could get." European TV
Programming, supra note 2.
60 Article 189b of the Maastricht Treaty provides:
1. Where reference is made in this Treaty to this Article for the
adoption of an act, the following procedure shall apply.
2. The Commission shall submit a proposal to the European
Parliament and the Council.
The Council, acting by a qualified majority after obtaining the
0pinion of the European Parliament, shall adopt a common position.
The common position shall be communicated to the European
Parliament. The Council shall inform the European Parliament fully
of the reasons which led it to adopt its common position. The
Commission shall inform the European Parliament fully of its
position.
If, within three months of such communication, the European
Parliament:
(a) approves the common position, the Council shall definitively
adopt the act in question in accordance with that common posi-
tion;
(b) has not taken a decision, the Council shall adopt the act in
question in accordance with its common position;
(c) indicates, by an absolute majority of its component members,
that it intends to reject the common position, it shall immediately
inform the Council. The Council may convene a meeting of the
Conciliation Committee referred to in paragraph 3 to explain
further its position. The European Parliament shall thereafter
either confirm, by an absolute majority of its component
members, its rejection of the common position, in which event
the proposed act shall be deemed not to have been ado pted, or
propose amendments in accordance with subparagraph (d of this
paragraph;
(d) proposes amendments to the common position by an absolute
majorit of its component members, the amended text shall be
forwarded to the Council and to the Commission, which shall
deliver an opinion on those amendments.
3. If, within three months of the matter referred to it, the Council,
acting by a qualified majority, approves all the amendments of the
European Parliament, it shall amend its common position accordingly
1996] 1137
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functions as the central government of the European Union and
it consists of the heads of each of the member states.6' The
European Parliament, on the other hand, is a more democratic
body consisting of "representatives of the peoples of the States
brought together in the Community."62
The European Council's duties include ensuring "coordination
and adopt the act in question; however, the Council shall act
unanimously on the amendments on which the Commission has
delivered a negative opinion. If the Council does not approve the act
in question, the President of the Council, in agreement with the
President of the European Parliament, shall forthwith convene a
meeting of the Conciliation Committee.
4. The Conciliation Committee, which shall be composed of the
members of the Council or their representatives and an equal number
of representatives of the European Parliament, shall have the task of
reaching agreement on a joint text, by a qualified majority of the
members of the Council or their representatives and by a majority of
the representatives of the European Parliament. The Commission
shall take part in the Conciliation Committee's proceedings and shall
take all the necessary initiatives with a view to reconciling the
positions of the European Parliament and the Council.
5. If, within six weeks of its being convened, the Conciliation
Committee approves a joint text, the European Parliament, acting by
an absolute majority of the votes cast, and the Council, acting by a
qualified majority, shall have a period of six weeks from that approval
in which to adopt the act in question in accordance with the joint text.
If one of the two institutions fails to approve the proposed act, it shall
be deemed not to have been adopted.
6. Where the Conciliation Committee does not approve a joint text,
the proposed act shall be deemed not to have been ado pted unless the
Council, acting by a qualified majority within six weeks of expiry of
the period &ranted to the Conciliation Committee, confirms the
common position to which it agreed before the conciliation procedure
was initiated, possibly with amendments proposed by the European
Parliament. In this case, the act in question shall be finally adopted
unless the European Parliament, within six weeks of the date of
confirmation by the Council, rejects the text by an absolute majority
of its component members, in which case the proposed act shall be
deemed not to have been adopted.
Maastricht Treaty, supra note 35, art. 189b(1)-(6).
61 Article 146 of the Maastricht Treaty states that "[t]he Council shall
consist of a representative of each Member State at ministerial level, authorized
to commit the government of that Member State." Id. art. 146. Therefore, a
civil servant cannot serve as a member of the Council. See D. LASOK, LASOK
& BRIDGE LAW & INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 196 (6th ed.
1994).
62 Maastricht Treaty, supra note 35, art. 137.
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of the general economic policies of the Member States."63 The
Council is a powerful institution that "represents the sovereign
power of the Member States in the Community and assumes
functions normally vested in a federal government."" The
European Council can hold specialized council meetings, such as
one concerning culture, which would be attended "by those
ministers whose portfolios relate to the specific subject on the
agenda."65
The European Parliament is organized similarly to the U.S.
House of Representatives in that the number of seats allocated to
a member state is governed by population.66 Nevertheless, even
the smallest states are guaranteed representation in the Parlia-
ment.67 Each member state has its own procedure for electing
its representatives to the Parliament." The Parliament is not a
legislative body and "its functions are of a supervisory and
advisory nature. " 69
Because of the co-decision procedure, the European Council's
November 30, 1995 decision to retain the Directive's 51%
requirement and the "where practicable" language was referred to
the European Parliament. The Parliament voted overwhelmingly,
295-165, against the Council and "set a minimum 51 percent
European content rule for a period of 10 years" and dropped the
"where practicable" loophole to make the requirement mandato-
ry.' The Parliament also ruled that the quota should apply to
teleshopping, video-on-demand, and Internet services. 71 Further-
more, the Parliament decided that future European Union
legislation should require installation of "chip technology" to
European television sets in order to allow parents to filter out
broadcasts unsuitable for children.72
63 Id. art. 145.
64 LASOK, supra note 61, at 197.
65 Id. at 196.
66 See id. at 214.
67 See id.
61 See id. at 216.
69 Id. at 219.
70 European Parliament Backs Tough Restrictions, supra note 7.
7' See European MPs Vote to Extend TV Quotas and Make Them Mandatory,
Deutsche Presse-Agentur, Feb. 14, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library,
Allwld File.
72 See European Parliament Backs Tough Restrictions, supra note 7.
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Because of the co-decision procedure, the fate of audiovisual
trade was ultimately decided by the European Council of Culture
Ministers on June 11, 1996.73 Once again, the Council decided,
as it had in November 1995, to maintain the Directive's 51%
requirement "where practicable." 74 The Council adopted less
than half of the amendments proposed by the Parliament and
rejected all of the major amendments, including the chip technolo-
gy requirement and the application of the quota requirement to
new services such as teleshopping, video-on-demand, and the
Internet.75  After this decision by the Council, the Parliament
needed a qualified majority of two-thirds of its members to force
conciliation talks with the Council.76 On November 12, 1996,
the Parliament fell twenty-three votes short of the qualified
majority, thus ending one of the European Union's "longest-
running sagas. '
While this recent European Union decision is not a complete
victory for the United States, it did allow "Europe's communica-
tions industry [to] breathe[] a sigh of relief, 78 and it should "sit
well with Hollywood. 7 9 As stated earlier, the "where practica-
ble" loophole allows European nations, including Britain and
Germany, which are opposed to setting television programming
quotas, to choose not to enforce the Directive. In addition, it is
unclear whether the 51% quota, which has existed since its
implementation by the Directive in 1989, has had any effect on
programming in the European Union to the detriment of the
'7 See McEvoy, Parliament Snubbed, supra note 1.
74 See id.
75 See id.; Janet McEvoy, Industry Rejoices Television Directive Decision,
Reuter European Community Report, June 12, 1996, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Reuec File [hereinafter McEvoy, Industry Rejoices].
76 See McEvoy, Industry Rejoices, supra note 75.
7 EU Parliament Drops Demand, supra note 10; see also European Deputies
Fail to Exclude U.S. Culture, Agence France Presse, Nov. 12, 1996, available in
LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File. Former French Culture Minister Jack
Lang said after the European Parliament's November 12, 1996 vote that
"Washington can be reassured. Whether it comes to Zaire or culture the
majority of Europeans lie down when America tells them to." EU Parliament
Drops Demand, supra note 10.
78 McEvoy, Industry Rejoices, supra note 75.
7' Buerkle, supra note 52, at 5.
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United States.8 °
3. UNDERSTANDING THE CULTURAL EXEMPTION ARGUMENT
The proponents of a cultural exemption for audiovisual goods
and services "share the belief that culture possesses certain values
that are inherently opposed to, and threatened by, commercial
forces; that the need for these values is universal; and that the
market cannot satisfy this need."8
During the Uruguay Negotiations, French Prime Minister
Edouard Balladur argued that "[the French] cannot accept
everything related to the fundamental values of our tradition, our
culture, our civilization [as] being treated like ordinary traded
goods."82 Former French Minister of Culture Jack Lang declared
that "[t]he soul of France cannot be sold for a few pieces of
silver."83 An impassioned French President Frangois Mitterrand
urged that "[w]hat is at stake, and therefore in peril, in the current
[Uruguay] negotiations is the right of each country to forge its
imagination and to transmit to future generations the representa-
tion of its own identity. "84
For many American commentators on the GATT, the notion
that the European Union wanted to protect cultural identity was
almost incomprehensible. Opponents of the cultural identity
argument questioned whether the European Union was truly
motivated by cultural reasons in restricting audiovisual trade.8
Rather, they were convinced that the European Union's insistence
on a cultural exemption was really a guise for economic protec-
" See Forrest, supra note 42, at 39 (stating that "[w]hile the U.S. film and
television programme industry lobbied hard against the quotas in the context
of the GATT Uruguay Round, there is no evidence that [the United States] or
other non-Community programmes were kept off European television channels
because of the quotas").
81 Shao, supra note 30, at 115.
82 Sands, supra note 17, at B7.
83 Id.
"4 Mitterand Denounces U.S. Domination at Francophone Summit, Agence
France Presse, Oct. 16, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
" Jack Valenti, head of the Motion Picture Association of America, said
of the European cultural identity argument: "If you equate Europe's game
shows and tak shows with Moliere and Racine, then that's about culture. But
the culture issue is a transparent cloak, and I want to disrobe Europe on this."
David Dodwell, U.S. Opts to Bide Time on Audio-visual Battle, FIN. TIMES, Dec.
15, 1993, at 6.
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tionism."
Other opponents of the cultural exemption for audiovisual
goods maintained that restricting the citizens of the European
Union from viewing American film and television programs
violated basic human rights.87 These opponents argued that
under Article 10(1) of the European Convention on Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,88 the guaranteed freedom of
expression encompasses the right to receive information. 9 In
1990, the European Court of Human Rights' decisions in
Groppera Radio A.G. v. Switzerland"0 and Autronic A.G. v.
Switzerland"' strengthened this argument by finding that Article
10's protection of the right to information applied to radio and
television.
While American commentators may dismiss the European
Union's cultural identity argument either as a mere cloak for
economic protectionism or as a violation of basic human rights,
a closer examination of the United States' own treatment and
regulation of its film and television industries reveals the same
concern for cultural identity expressed by the European Union.
The aim of this section is to examine the United States as a case
study so as to better understand the cultural protectionist
motivations that may influence a country to regulate its film and
television. By studying the United States' own policies with
regard to film and television, Americans may gain a better
86 Valenti called the European Union's push for cultural exemption of
audiovisual trade, "blatant protectionism unmasked." U.S. Industry, Members
of Congress Offer Mixed Reaction, But Most Back Accord, 10 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) No. 49, at 2109, 2110 (Dec. 15, 1993).
8 See Shao, supra note 30, at 142-44, ("[N]otions of cultural protection
based on sovereignty are not inevitably benign. In fact, such notions represent
the predictable and continuing tendency of nation-states to undervalue the
benefits of unrestricted information flows. Recognition of this tendency and
its negative impact on society as a whole strongly cautions against the adoption
or continuance of culture-specific import restrictions in [audiovisual] trade.").
88 See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 10, para. 1, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
89 "Article F(2) of the Maastricht Treaty now provides an express basis for
the protection of fundamental rights 'as guaranteed by the European Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in
Rome on November 4, 1950.. . .- Heinrich Kirschner, The Framework of the
European Union Under the Treaty of Maastricht, 13 J.L. & COM. 233, 234 (1994).
9' 173 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 45 (1990).
91 178 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 35-36 (1990).
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understanding of the European Union's support of a cultural
exemption of audiovisual goods.
3.1. The United States' Regulation of Broadcasting
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees the
right to free speech. 92 Many Americans believe that the guaran-
tee of free speech also includes a guarantee of free access to
information and therefore, a limited governmental role in the
regulation of film and television. 3 As one commentator argues,
however, "[t]he First Amendment can be read as an allocation of
regulatory authority among those who control the market for
loyalties rather than a mandate for unfettered speech." 94 Accord-
ing to this view of the United States' film and television industry,
"[t]he conventional wisdom is that broadcasting is the one
communication medium in which the First Amendment permits
government regulation." 5
92 The First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States provides:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
"' Professor Monroe E. Price of Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law
writes:
Basic to the American sense of itself is the historical aversion to the
idea that government shapes, or has any role in mediating, national
identity. In other words, the state's role in the structure of speech and
media is and ought to be minimal.. . . The nineteenth-century frontier
mentality, still flaunted and still generative of the American character,
was framed in antigovernment terms. Gritty independence, in action
as well as speech, remains one of the key elements of American nation-
al identity.
Monroe E. Price, The Market for Loyalties: Electronic Media and the Global
Competition for Allegiances, 104 YALE LJ. 667, 684 (1994).
9' Id. at 685.
C. Edwin Baker, Turner Broadcasting: Content-Based Regulation of Persons
and Presses, in THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW 58 (Dennis J. Hutchinson et al.
eds., 1994).
In Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, the Supreme Court held that the Federal
Communications Commission's ("FCC") fairness doctrine, which required that
broadcasters allow fair coverage to both sides of issues presented, and regulation
of the fairness doctrine in regard to personal attack situations, did not violate
the First Amendment of the Constitution. See Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367, 375 (1969). The Court stated that with regard to the First
Amendment, "[i]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the
broadcasters, which is paramount." Id. at 390.
11431996]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
3.1.1. Turner Broadcasting v. FCC
The case of Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC6 demon-
strates that the First Amendment permits the U.S. government to
regulate broadcasting. The Turner Broadcasting decision accords
with prior decisions and reveals that "historically, acceptance of
content-based governmental involvement with the communica-
tions order has been a constant and that courts have routinely
upheld the governmental involvement on the few occasions when
the communications industries challenged it on First Amendment
grounds."'
In Turner Broadcasting, cable programmers and operators
challenged the constitutionality of the Cable Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act of 199298 ("1992 Act"), which
required cable television systems to carry local broadcast sta-
tions.99 The Court, after applying the intermediate standard of
scrutiny set forth in United States v. O'Brien,1° held that the
must-carry rules of the 1992 Act were designed to further
important governmental purposes." 1 The Court stated that the
1992 Act served three important governmental interests: "(1)
preserving the benefits of free, over-the-air local broadcast
television, (2) promoting the widespread dissemination of
information from a multiplicity of sources, and (3) promoting fair
competition in the market for television programming."1
Implicit in this decision is that the U.S. government may
regulate broadcasting to promote interests that are valued in our
culture such as preserving free information and promoting the
96 Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
17 Baker, supra note 95, at 62.
" Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992,47
U.S.C. S 534, 535 (1994).
9' See Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2451.
" United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). According to O'Brien,
a content-neutral regulation will be sustained "if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to
the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of
that interest." Id. at 377.
.01 See Turner Broadcasting, 114 S.Ct. at 2469-70.
102 Id. at 2469.
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widespread dissemination of information.0 3 Professor C. Edwin
Baker of the University of Pennsylvania Law School argues that:
the government has ... always engaged in regulation to
advance its conception of a desirable communications
order-a conception that includes promotion of viewpoint
diversity, quality of discourse, education, and ease of
participation. A democracy concerned with promoting
collective conceptions of the good arguably requires this
form of regulation.' °4
Thus, in order to promote what is considered "good" in American
culture,10 5 the U.S. government plays an active role in regulating
broadcasting." 6
103 Professor Price writes that "[t]he powers of the [Federal Communica-
tions Commission], Congress, and the White House have all been used as
weapons in the battleground for competing notions of the good, the ideal
model for organizing and directing society, basic ideas of cohesion, and the
definition of community." Price, supra note 93, at 688.
Furthermore, Professor Price points out that the objections of Former Vice
President Dan Quayle and Secretary of Health and Human Services Donna
Shalala to the television character Murphy Brown's decision to raise her out-of-
wedlock baby as a single parent, are examples of the U.S. government's
pressure to change and influence television stories. See id. at 691-692.
104 Baker, supra note 95, at 81.
105 The regulation of sex and violence in television is also a demonstration
of the United States' regulation of broadcasting based on cultural protectionism.
By attempting to place limits as to the amount of sex and violence that can be
shown on television, the U.S. government is defining what is and what is not
acceptable in the American society-in the American culture-through the
regulation of broadcasting. For a discussion of television violence and how
U.S. policymakers should aim to regulate it, see Stephen J. Kim, Comment,
"Viewer Discretion Is Advised": A Structural Approach to the Issue of Television
Violence, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1383 (1994).
1C6 Professor Baker writes that:
[d]emocratic theory requires a government role. Since all laws
inevitably favor some conceptions of the good over others, rationality
virtually requires that the choice of laws turn in part on collective
notions of the good. Indeed, one purpose of democratic government
is to provide for collective means to promote conceptions of the good
in contexts where individual decision making would be inadequate for
realizing the chosen conceptions.
Baker, supra note 95, at 85.
Professor Price argues that the state serves as a "generator of images . . .
Not only have governments sought to exclude a range of destabilizing
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3.2. The United States Limits its Telecommunication Markets
While the United States wants the European Union to allow
the free trade of audiovisual products and services, the United
States in section 310(b) of the Communications Act of 1934,
imposes its own restrictions on foreign ownership of radio
stations, broadcast television, and telephone companies that use
wireless communication links." The European Union's insis-
tence on a cultural exemption and the United States' restriction
on foreign ownership of the telecommunication markets both
demonstrate the efforts of those governments to limit the influx
of foreign products and ideas. As one commentator writes of the
U.S. law, "Section 310(b)'s foreign ownership restriction today
represents an anachronistic attempt to limit free speech in
America based on xenophobic fears of foreign ideas and influ-
ence."
08
Section 310(b) restricts to whom the FCC may grant licenses
for "radio communication" or "radio transmission. " "°9 The
terms "radio communication" and "radio transmission" apply "not
only to those frequencies used for commercial radio, but also to
most wireless communication, including television broadcasting,
paging networks, microwave transmissions, and satellite
links."" °  Section 310(b)1  states that the FCC may not grant
narratives, they have also sought to ensure that a sense of national identity is
available and, if possible, prevails. The preoccupation with flags, including
their proper veneration, is the most obvious of such efforts." Price, supra note
93, at 677.
107 47 U.S.C. S 310(b) (1994).
108 Ian M. Rose, Note, Barring Foreigners from Our Airwaves: An
Anachronistic Pothole on the Global Information Highway, 95 CoLUM. L. REV.
1188, 1190 (1995).
109 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1994).
110 Rose, supra note 108, at 1188 n.5.
.. Section 310(b) states that:
No broadcast or common carrier or aeronautical en route or aeronauti-
cal fixed radio station license shall be granted to or held by-
1) any alien or the representative of any alien;
2) any corporation organized under the laws of any foreign
government;
3) any corporation of which more than one-fifth of the capital
stock is owned of record or voted by aliens or their representa-
tives or by a foreign government or representative thereof or by
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broadcasting licenses to any aliens or any foreign corpora-
tions."' No corporation in which more than 20% of the stock
is owned by an alien or a foreign corporation may receive a
broadcast license."' In addition, it is within the FCC's discre-
tion to deny a license to any corporation that is directly or
indirectly held by another corporation with alien or foreign ties
"if the Commission finds that the public interest will be served by
the refusal or revocation of such license."
4
Originally, Section 310(b) was enacted to restrict foreign
ownership in order to protect national security interests.1 The
U.S. government feared that foreign ownership of radio broadcast
stations would lead to the dissemination of subversive propaganda,
the conveyance of sensitive military information to foreign
enemies, and the possible interference with the government's
military transmissions. 6 Today, however, section 310(b) is used
primarily in actions having no relation to national security.
Parties now invoke this law to challenge foreign ownership of and
foreign investment in American television broadcasting sta-
tions.1 17 For example, in a recent section 310(b) case, In re The
any corporation organized under the laws of a foreign country;
4) any corporation directly or indirectly controlled by any other
corporation of which more than one-fourth of the capital stock is
owned of record or voted by aliens, their representatives, or by a
foreign government or representative thereof, or by any corpo-
ration organized under the laws of a foreign country, if the
Commission finds that the public interest will1 be served by the
refusal or revocation of such license.
47 U.S.C. § 310(b) (1994), asamended by Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 131-32 (1996).
112 See id. 3 310(b)(1)-(2).
113 See id. 3 310(b)(3).
114 Id. § 3 10(b) (4).
115 See Rose, supra note 108, at 1194-96.
116 See id. at 1195.
17 Section 310(b) was recently raised in the dispute over media mogul
Rupert Murdoch's formation of the Fox Television Network. Murdoch, a
former Australian citizen, became an American citizen in order to receive a
broadcasting license from the FCC. The television network NBC and the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People both filed
multiple petitions with the FCC, claiming that Murdoch still violated section
310(b) because part of the financing for the Fox Network was from an
Australian company. See Rose, supra note 108, at 1196-97.
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Seven Hills Television Co.,18 the "FCC ordered Seven Hills to
limit its financial ties with a Mexican family which had large
holdings and experience in the Mexican television industry and
which was seeking to export its Spanish-language programming
into international markets."n9
Decisions such as In re Seven Hills Television Co. have led com-
mentators to speculate that section 310(b) is used today to restrict
the influx of foreign speech and programming into the United
States."0 In fact, section 310(b), in many respects, acts as a
protectionist device to shield our telecommunications market from
foreign influence and ownership.12 The combination of section
310(b) and U.S. broadcasting regulations discussed in the previous
subsection shows that cultural identity concerns are not exclusive
to the European Union. Rather, many nations, including the
United States, value and promote cultural protectionism.
4. GLOBALIZATION OF COMMUNICATION AND THE
UNIFICATION OF EUROPE
While Section 3 of this Comment argued that the European
Union's cultural identity argument is both legitimate and
persuasive, this Section demonstrates that the globalization of
communication and the unification of Europe means that
ultimately, regardless of the lack of a cultural exemption to the
GATT, the US.-European audiovisual trade will not be signifi-
cantly impacted by the result of the Uruguay Round.
118 In re The Seven Hills Television Co., 2 F.C.C.R. 6867 (Rev. Bd. 1987).
19 Rose, supra note 108, at 1197.
120 See id. at 1229.
121 In the 1993 report entitled "Globalization of the Mass Media," the U.S.
Department of Commerce recommended the liberalization of section 310(b).
The report stated that "the benefits of removing the foreign ownership
restrictions in section 310(b), in terms of potential increases in investment
opportunities overseas in foreign media markets, sources of investment in
domestic broadcast firms, and quality of programming substantially outweigh
the security concerns that first animated adoption of these restrictions."
National Telecommunications & Information Administration, U.S. Dep't of
Commerce, Special Pub. No. 93-290, Globalization of the Mass Media 78-79
(1993). It is noteworthy that these arguments for the removal of section 310(b)
restrictions are very similar to the arguments many American commentators
have made against the cultural exemption of audiovisual trade.
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4.1. Globalization of Communication
With time, technological advances in global communications
will break down any national barriers established to restrict the
influx of American film and television programming into the
European Union. Cable, direct-to-home satellites, and cyberspace
computer technology all have the potential to render ineffective
attempts by individual member states of the European Union to
strictly regulate broadcasting.' Britain, Germany, and the
Scandinavian countries all have recognized that "satellite broadcast-
ing makes quotas impracticable."1'2
Cable and satellite broadcasting allows the direct transmission
of American programming to European homes. 24 Although
governments may have some measure of control over cable
systems, satellite transmissions will be much harder for European
governments to regulate because the signal can be sent directly to
individual dishes.
Another important player in the globalization of communica-
tion is the computer, which now provides users with easy access
to the information superhighway. Advances in computer-based
networks will soon enable European households to receive
American programming via cyberspace.1 5 New technology is
1 See Price, supra note 93, at 696.
123 Bates, supra note 22, at 8.
124 See P. Van Binst, Satellites, in LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 137, 139 (Sylvie Schaff ed., 1990). Professor Van Binst
announced in 1988 that:
[c]ommunication satellites have [sic] appeared about fifteen years ago
to supplement submarine telephone cables and to provide for easy and
cheap television broadcasting ....
... [S]atellite technology is... improving significantly, notably by the
provision of high power beams, allowing the use of very small
antennas, and our society is developing growing needs to communicate
with everything, including moving correspondants [sic]. These two
elements can undoubtedly be seen as key factors to a bright future for
communication satellites.
Id. at 139-140.
125 See Rose, supra note 108, at 1231. For an introduction to cyberspace,
see Eric J. McCarthy, Comment, Networking in Cyberspace: Electronic
Defamation and the Potential for International Forum Shopping, 16 U. PA. J.
INT'L BUS. L. 527, 527-37 (1995).
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"turning the Internet 126 into a virtual broadcasting medium," "
which may soon allow individuals to order television programs via
the Internet.128 The European Union has kept pace with tech-
nology: as of July 1995, the number of European computers
connected to the Internet was over 1.5 million.129  Ten Europe-
an countries have been among the top twenty nations in the
highest number of computers connected to the Internet.13
These countries included: the United Kingdom, Germany, the
Netherlands, France, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Switzerland,
Italy, and Austria.131 It may be difficult for European govern-
ments to restrict their citizens from viewing American program-
ming via cyberspace because the Internet transmits data globally.
Like cable and direct-to-home satellites, cyberspace bypasses
government regulation of film and television and permits
Europeans to access American programs directly.
4.2. Unification of Europe
Another factor that will influence the effect of a cultural
exemption on audiovisual trade between the United States and the
European Union is the unification of European nations. On
February 7, 1992, the foreign ministers of twelve European
nations signed the Treaty on the European Union in Maastricht
("Maastricht Treaty"), 32 thereby creating the European Un-
ion.133  After ratification by the member states, the Maastricht
126 The Internet is a "computer network which now links computers over
long distances using telephone wire, fiber optic cable, and satellite transmission.
Worldwide use of the [Internet] has grown so quickly that it now serves as 'an
all-purpose network, that, within limits, lets anyone send anything digital to
anyone anywhere.'" McCarthy, supra note 125, at 535 (footnote omitted)
(quoting John W. Verity & Robert D. Hof, The Internet: How It Will Change
the Way You Do Business, Bus. WK., Nov. 14, 1994, at 80, 81).
"2 Peter H. Lewis, Peering Out a 'Real Time' Window, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
8, 1995, at D1.
128 See id.
129 See MARY J. CRONIN, GLOBAL ADVANTAGE ON THE INTERNET 120
(1996).
130 See id.
131 See id.
132 Maastricht Treaty, supra note 35, at 255.
133 See Sophie Vanhoonacker, From Maastricht to Karlsruhe: The Long Road
to Ratification, in THE RATIFICATION OF THE MAASTRICHT TREATY: ISSUES,
DEBATES AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS 3, 3 (Finn Laursen & Sophie
Vanhoonacker eds., 1994) [hereinafter RATIFICATION OF THE MAASTRICHT
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Treaty entered into force on November 1, 1993.134 The first
article of the Treaty defines the overall goal of the member states
in the creation of the European Union:
This Treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating
an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in
which decisions are taken as closely as possible to the
citizen.
The Union shall be founded on the European Communi-
ties, supplemented by the policies and forms of coopera-
tion established by this Treaty. Its task shall be to
organize, in a manner demonstrating consistency and
solidarity, relations between the Member States and
between their peoples. 35
The Maastricht Treaty organizes the European Union into
three pillars.1 16 The first pillar consists of the European Com-
munities.1 7 The European Communities are made up of: 1) the
European Community responsible for economic and monetary
union, 2) the Euratom, and 3) the European Coal & Steel
Community.138 The second pillar is the Common Foreign &
Security Policy,139 and the third pillar is the Cooperation in
Justice & Home Affairs."0
For the original planners of the Maastricht Treaty, the
creation of the Common Foreign & Security Policy ("CFSP")
TREATY]. The original twelve nations are Belgium, Denmark, Germany,
Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal,
and the United Kingdom. For a brief and general introduction to the
European Union, see Kirschner, supra note 89, at 233.
134 See Vanhoonacker, supra note 133, at 3.
1 Maastricht Treaty, supra note 35, at 255.
136 See Edward Best, The Treaty on European Union: What Does It Actually
Say and Do?, in RATIFICATION OF THE MAASTRICHT TREATY, supra note 133,
at 17, 20-21.
137 See id.
138 See id.
139 See id.
140 See id.
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pillar was a vital component for the unification of Europe.141
The Maastricht Treaty provides for "'systematic cooperation
between Member States in the conduct of policy,' through
systematic information and consultation; the adoption by the
Council by unanimity of common positions 'whenever it deems
it necessary'; and coordination of action in international organiza-
tions and conferences." 42 The CFSP, coupled with the econom-
ic powers of the European Community, renders trade policy an
"exclusive Community competence" 43 within the European
Union.
Because trade policy is decided on a Community-wide basis, it
is clear that no one single member state may decide the fate of
audiovisual trade for the entire European Union. Rather, all the
nations must cooperate and negotiate to reach a unanimous
decision on specific trade policies. With nations such as the
United Kingdom and Germany opposed to the application of
television quotas, it is unlikely that the entire European Union
will ever impose a strict trade policy on audiovisual goods and
services.
5. CONCLUSION
For the United States, the Uruguay Round of the GATT was
generally a success, liberalizing world trade in many areas. The
failure to reach an agreement with the European Union on the
treatment of audiovisual trade, however, was a painful loss for the
United States. The exclusion of film and television goods and
services from the free trade guarantees of the GATT endangered
the profitability of the United States' second largest export,
entertainment, which generates an estimated annual trade of four
billion dollars between the United States and the European
Union. T4
During the negotiations of the Uruguay Round, the Europeans
141 See Sophie Vanhoonacker, A Critical Issue: From European Political
Cooperation to a Common Foreign and Security Policy, in THE INTERGOVERN-
MENTAL CONFERENCE ON POLITICAL UNION 25, 25 (Finn Laursen & Sophie
Vanhoonacker eds., 1992) (stating that "[a]ll major proposals on European
Union emphasize the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP) as one of their vital components").
112 Best, supra note 136, at 37 (quoting Article J.1 of the Maastricht Treaty).
143 Id. at 23 (emphasis added).
144 See Sands, supra note 17, at B7.
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campaigned for a cultural exemption for audiovisual trade under
the GATT, while the United States argued for the inclusion of
audiovisual goods and services. This dispute between the
European Union and the United States threatened to derail the
entire GATT Round, but in the end, the trading partners agreed
to disagree and left audiovisual trade out of the GATT, thus
saving seven years of negotiation.
The European Union in general, and France in particular,
viewed the exclusion of audiovisual trade as a victory in its fight
to preserve and protect European cultural identity. Many
Americans, especially the Hollywood industry, maintained that
European cultural protectionism was actually a guise for economic
protectionism. Other opponents of the cultural exemption of
audiovisual trade argued that the restriction of American program-
ming violated European citizens' basic human right to free access
of information. Ironically, a close examination of the U.S.
broadcasting regulations reveals that the United States is itself
often motivated by cultural protectionist concerns. The United
States' own cultural protectionist policies in the field of broadcast-
ing demonstrate the legitimacy of the European Union's argument
that each nation has a strong need to preserve its own cultural
identity.
Although the cultural identity argument is a strong rationale
for exempting audiovisual trade from the GATT, the globalization
of communications and the unification of Europe demonstrate
that the exemption will not significantly injure the U.S.-European
Union audiovisual trade. The globalization of communication,
with technological advances in cable television, direct-to-home
satellites, and cyberspace, make it virtually impossible for
governments to keep European citizens from receiving and
viewing American programming. The unification of the European
nations means that trade policy must be decided on a European
community-wide basis. With the United Kingdom and Germany,
among other nations, opposed to the application of television
quotas, which they view as inhibiting free trade, the European
Union will not be able to enact the strict trade policy desired by
the French. The recent European Union decision to maintain the
"where applicable" loophole demonstrates that the influence of
other nations forced the French to weaken their original tough
stance. The European Union television quota decision shows that
ultimately the failure of the Uruguay Round to include audiovisu-
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al trade in the GATT will not harm or significantly impede the
U.S.-European Union audiovisual trade.
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